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II

INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENTS-THE PAROL
EVIDENCE RULE AND AN EXCEPTION FOR
ERRONEOUS DESCRIPTION
Few doctrines are more firmly established in our law than the
rule that on the question of interpretation of a legal instrument
declarations of intention of the maker or makers dealing with
the subject of the specific document are inadmissible.'
Such
statements, though not excluded on the ground of hearsay, being
clearly admissible under the exception for Declarations Evidencing
Physical or Mental Condition, are with equal clearness prohibited
by the so-called Parol Evidence Rule (and'in case of wills by the
further consideration that their use would, in general, contravene
the policy of the Statute of Wills as to oral testaments).' To this
exclusionary rule there is, however, a well-recognized exception
' See, e.g., Knowlton v. Campbell, 48 W. Va. 294, 37 S. E. 581 (1900);
Ferimer v. Lewis, Hubbard & Co., 114 W. Va. 629, 173 S. E. 264 (1934).
2 See 9 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2471. Of. THAYER, PRELImINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (1898) 444 et seq.
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which is commonly known as Latent Ambiguity or, more accurately,
as Equivocation.3
The West Virginia case of Snider v. Robinett4 is a good illustration of the nature and application of this exception. In that case
a written agreement contained a provision that one of the parties
was "to furnish .. a road" leading from a designated tract of
land, for the purpose of hauling certain lumber to market. There
were, however, two roads to which the language might refer," and
one question was whether mutual declarations of the writers' intentions were admissible to identify the particular road that the
parties had in mind. The court admitted the evidence on the
ground that where there is a "latent ambiguity . . . such for instance as that the terms of the writing are equally applicable to
two or more objects, when only a certain one of them was meant,
then prior and contemporaneous . . collocutions of the parties are
admissible for the purpose of identifying the particular object
intended."
There is no doubt as to the authorities where as in this case
the language in the writing accurately fits two or more persons or
things. Courts quite generally admit direct declarations df intention in such cases for the purpose of identifying the person or
thing that was meant. 7 The reason for the exception is that the
ordinary danger inherent in using "any extrinsic utterance .to
compete with and overthrow the words of a document which solely
embodies the transaction" does not exist, to any great degree,
where the writing, upon application to external facts, is found to
fit two or more of them equally and accurately, i. e., in case of
equivocation. 8
Where, however, the document, upon applying it to the external object or objects indicated in the writing, is found to fit
two or more persons or things with substantial equality-but inaccurately-i. e., where there is an Erroneous Description which
is, broadly speaking, equally applicable to two or more objects, the
3 See

9 WiomoR,

MrmDECE

§ 2472.

As to an exception other than the ones

discussed in the body of this note, see id. § 2475 (exception for "Rebutting
an Equity ".)

478 IV. Va. 88, 88 S.E.599 (1916).
.There was only one road at the time the writing was executed.
8 The language quoted is from the syllabus.
7 See, e.g., to much the same effect as Snider v. Robinett, Johnson v. Burns,
39 W. Va. 658, 20 S.E. 686 (1894). For a collection of authorities see 9 Wiomom, EvinExcE § 2472. See also 2 JoNns, EvmENc., (4th ed. 1938) § 480.
8 See 9 WIGmORE, EVIOENCE §§ 2471, 2472. See also THAYEa, lo. oit. &%pra
n. 2.
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cases are far from clear as to the admissibility of this kind of
evidence for the purpose of interpreting the language used. Indeed,
the leading authority on the question declares that in the United
States "the question has seldom been raised, and no distinct rule
can be predicated.'"' A recent decision in point by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is therefore of particular importance, and is all the more interesting in that it islin effect, a decision
by a divided court.10
In that ease a testator executed a will, the disputed portion
of which read as follows (the italicized language constituting what
was admittedly a misdeseription" ) :
"I will and devise to my two sons the several contiguous
tracts of land constituting my home farm to be divided by a
line beginning at a stake on top of what is known as the Capon
Knob, a corner to the A. T. Petry and Henry Gerwig lands
and running in a north east direction to a hickory in edge of
field near where sled road starts off the mountain, and then
in an easterly direction to the corner of the W. S. Teter lot on
the bank of Middle Fork of Cedar Creek, the said Virgil 0.
Sands to have all the land lying on the north-western side of
said line and the said Vail F. Sands to have all on the south
eastern side thereof."
It was conceded that in locating the division line indicated in
this part of the instrument the testator became confused as to the
points of the compass. Accordingly certain pre-testamentary
declarations of his were offered (along with other evidence) to
show what he meant when he used the descriptive terms "northwestern" and "south eastern." The exact tenor of these utterances is not altogether clear from the ease as reported. It would
seem, however, that the utterances were of the forbidden variety,' 2
viz., direct declarations of intention dealing -with the subject of
the writing, for the syllabus contains the following statement, and
only the following statement: "Oral testimony of the declared intention of a testator is admissible proof for the purpose of clarifying a latent ambiguity contained in the language of will.""
That the words of the will, when applied to the physical
9 9 WIGmORE, EvImNC § 2474.
10 Sands v. Sands, 12 S. E. (2d) 918 (W. Va. 1941).
11The word "easterly"
is italicized in the opinion of the court. Other
italics
ours.
2
1 As to the admissibility of other interpretive evidence than direct declarations of intention, see Hardman, A Problem in Interpretation (1936) 42 W.
VA. L. Q. 110.
13 Italics ours.
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objects indicated in it, turn out to be erroneous description, not
equivocation, seems too clear to justify discussion. Hence the
evidence in question (if direct declarations of intention) cannot be
admitted under the established exception, and the trial court
refused to receive the evidence. But the Supreme Court of Appeals
(Fox and Riley, J. J., concurring as to result but excluding the
disputed evidence from their conclusions) admitted the declarations, without citation of authority. Apparently therefore the
case must be regarded as sanctioning the admissibility of this class
of declarations in cases of erroneous description. Every reason that
can be adduced in behalf of the settled exception, except precedent
and certainty, applies with equal force to a misdescription which
fits "equally"' 4 but inaccurately two or more external objects.
And the court, though adhering to the language technique of
established doctrine, evidently recognizes the cogency of this argument." It is another striking example of the time-honored common-law method of putting new wine in old bottles. Judicial legislation, yes, but interstitial' 6
The case is an illuminating illustration of the judicial tendency in recent years to liberalize the rules that deal with the adnssibility of interpretive evidence. Courts should be, and to an
increasingly greater extent are, extremely reluctant to exclude
logically relevant evidence unless there is a very strong reason for
so doing. Hence the court would seem to be on sound ground in
extending the established exception to include erroneous description, or, more accurately, in sanctioning a new exception. Ubi
eadem ratio ibi idem jus.
Thomas P. Hardman.
14"Equally",2i.e., in a substantial sense.
'-For
a collection of authorities supporting the position taken in the
principal cae, see 9 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2474.
16 "Judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially:
they are confined from molar to molecular motion."
Holmes, J., in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 S. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086 (1917).
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